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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Liaison Committee is a select committee of the House of Commons, comprising of all 
the MPs who are select committee chairs. Amongst many varied tasks, the Liaison Committee 
has a specific remit to take oral evidence from the Prime Minister up to three times per year. 
The Liaison Committee’s sessions with the Prime Minister, though established in 2002, have 
gained little recognition. This report seeks to illuminate this little understood area of 
parliamentary work. The research, a collaboration between researchers at Canterbury Christ 
Church University, University of Southampton and the University of Canberra, investigated 
how effective these sessions were and how they work to hold the Prime Minister to account. 
This project contributes to our understanding of both the limits and the possibilities of 
democratic accountability mechanisms in the UK. 
The Liaison Committee sessions with the Prime Minister represent an important scrutiny 
mechanism and the sessions now form an established conduit between the executive and 
the legislature. The sessions are unusual as a standalone evidence exercise and it is hard to 
find equivalent sessions in other jurisdictions. The sessions provide a complementary forum 
for senior committee chairs to engage with the Prime Minister beyond the partisan arena of 
Prime Minister’s Questions. This analytical and deliberative setting is much more conducive 
to informative and illuminating exchanges. 
The report is divided into five sections. The introduction sets out the origins of the Committee, 
why it was established and how it has developed since 2002. It also looks briefly at relevant 
accountability mechanisms in the devolved administrations. Section 2 considers how the 
Committee functions and what we have learnt from the process. Section 3 draws on our 
interview data to evaluate the sessions. Section 4 builds on this evaluation to consider 
possible options for reform before the concluding section. 
We found that the Liaison Committee sessions with the Prime Minister are now well 
established and have much to recommend them. We found that this analytical and 
deliberative setting is much more conducive to informative and illuminating exchanges than 
PMQs. Reforms have narrowed the number of participants and focused the content of 
sessions. The sessions do however have the potential to enhance the relationship between 
the Prime Minister and the legislature. More frequent appearances by the Prime Minister, 
including an appearance at the start of a parliamentary term, sharper questioning, a greater 
clarity of purpose and focus from the Committee would raise the profile of the evidence 
sessions and add to the scrutiny function of Parliament in holding the Prime Minister to 
account for whole-of-government activity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PRIME MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT 
Within the contemporary debate on declining engagement with Parliament, increasingly 
centralised power, stronger party cohesion and personalised executive leadership, select 
committees have presented a welcome boost to the accountability and scrutiny function of 
Parliament. With greater authority and legitimacy flowing from select committees, it follows 
that the Liaison Committee made up of committee chairs should also be an empowered 
parliamentary resource. Bucking the trend of declining engagement, one accountability 
reform has the potential to alter the balance between executive and legislature, as envisaged 
by the Wright reforms. 
We conducted interviews with current and former members of the Liaison Committee, 
parliamentary officials and journalists. We also interviewed former Number 10 staff and 
consulted with representatives from the devolved assemblies.
1
 We analysed the transcripts 
from each session encompassing 11 sessions with Tony Blair, 5 with Gordon Brown, and 15 
with David Cameron. This report is one part of an output of material that includes an 
academic article in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, which we draw 
on in this report. Two further articles are to be published in due course covering: questioning 
styles in the Committee and prime ministerial performance in the sessions. 
 
The most public aspect of prime ministerial accountability is 
at Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs). In contrast, the Liaison 
Committee sessions with the Prime Minister gain little 
recognition. In 2002, after long resisting, Tony Blair finally 
agreed to appear before the Liaison Committee—the select 
committee comprising the chairs of the other select 
committees—twice a year to answer questions on policy 
matters for at least two hours. This formal scrutiny function 
has now operated for fourteen years, questioning three 
different Prime Ministers. It generated some initial media 
attention before becoming an established part of the 
parliamentary mechanism. These appearances (subsequently 
increased to three times a year) represent an important 
forum for engagement between the Prime Minister and 
parliament. The Committee provides a forum where the Prime Minister can be interrogated 
in a less partisan, more detailed and more deliberative manner than the weekly jousts at 
PMQs provide. Some journalists mocked the sessions as ‘bore-a-thons’ that do not leave 
                                                          
1
 We conducted 15 in-depth interviews and had additional informal exchanges with participants. 
The Committee 
provides a forum where 
the Prime Minister can 
be interrogated in a less 
partisan, more detailed 
and more deliberative 
manner than the 
weekly jousts at PMQs 
provide. 
7 | P a g e  
 
‘blood on the carpet’, but that is almost the point. The sessions are generally informative 
exchanges on cross-cutting topics, broad government strategy and current issues. When 
canvassed the public found these sessions positive, but knew little about them.
2
 
1.2 LIAISON COMMITTEE EVIDENCE SESSIONS 
The Liaison Committee evidence sessions with the Prime Minister therefore represent 
important connective tissue between the executive and the legislature, but have thus far 
attracted little research attention. Without a department, the Prime Minister is subject to less 
systematic parliamentary scrutiny than the members of his own cabinet. The select 
committee system largely mirrors the departmental structure of Government. This has meant 
that the Prime Minister traditionally refused to appear before parliamentary committees.
3
 
The Prime Minister does appear for parliamentary questions in the Commons chamber (and 
the ministers also have regular question sessions scheduled). If accountability involves finding 
out what has been done and why, then PMQ as it is currently constituted can swiftly be 
dismissed as an effective means of holding the Prime Minister to account, for it does neither. 
Instead PMQs fulfils other political imperatives.
4
By contrast, the Liaison Committee sessions 
provide an altogether different institutional forum through which scrutiny can be conducted 
and, perhaps, accountability obtained, located as they are in committee rooms away from 
the partisan battle of the chamber, and in a working environment where the norms and 
objectives of committee operation are commonly understood and accepted. Analysis of the 
Liaison Committee is therefore timely. The Committee has been cited by parliamentarians as 
an important means of holding the Prime Minister to account. The Political and 
Constitutional Reform Select Committee, for instance recommended strengthening the 
Committee.
5
 
Traditionally the Liaison Committee focused on administering the select committee system, 
it had positioned itself as a pivotal scrutiny stakeholder in 2000 with a key report which 
sought to rebalance the relationship between Parliament and government,
6
 and staked a 
claim for its suitability as a forum through which the Prime Minister could be scrutinised. It 
championed the new format on the grounds that it would provide a ‘calmer setting’ for 
more ‘productive and informative’ scrutiny than was ordinarily available through PMQs due 
                                                          
2
 Hansard Society, Tuned in or Turned off? Public attitudes to Prime Minister's Questions, London, Hansard 
Society, 2014. 
3
 A little noticed break with this convention did occur in 2014 when the Prime Minister appeared before the 
Joint Committee on National Security Strategy but it would seem that no precedent has been established. See 
JCNSS, Oral Evidence, 30 January 2014, Session 2014-14, HC 1040. 
4
 M Shephard (2015) Prime Minister’s Questions: Perpetual Pointless Puerile Panto Politics?, PSA Parliaments 
and Legislatures Blog, 14 October 2015. 
5
 HC 351 (2014) The Role and Powers of the Prime Minister, First Report of Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee. London, TSO. 
6
 Liaison Committee, Shifting the Balance: Unfinished Business, 1
st
 Report of Session 2000-01, HC 321. 
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its ‘confrontational exchanges and theatrical style’. 7  This scrutiny mechanism has now 
operated for over 14 years, and involved the questioning of three Prime Ministers. Yet despite 
constituting a remarkable institutional innovation in parliamentary practice, and ‘a significant 
advance in the scrutiny of the Prime Minister’, 8  it has not been subject to systematic 
examination. 
1.3 ORIGINS OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE SESSIONS 
Secretaries of State and ministers have appeared regularly before departmental select 
committees since their creation in 1979, to give evidence about their policy responsibilities 
and departmental activities. However, despite the increasingly prominent role played by 
departmental select committees in the decades since their formation, the Prime Minister did 
not appear before them. The failure of the Prime Minister to be subject to select committee 
scrutiny was viewed by many MPs as a serious problem. In 2000, as part of its inquiry in to 
the Ministerial Code, the Public Administration Committee wrote to the then-Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, inviting him to give evidence, on the basis that the Code was the responsibility of 
the Prime Minister and underwent revisions at his or her behest, and so only the Prime 
Minister could be held accountable to parliament for it. Blair rejected this view, citing the 
tradition of ministerial responsibility for providing select committee evidence, and noting 
that ‘Prime Ministers have not themselves, by long-standing convention, given evidence to 
Select Committees’.9 The Liaison Committee pursued the matter in a report on executive 
scrutiny, which advocated the benefits of the Prime Minister discussing government policies 
in a non-partisan forum, and noted that if he accepted an annual invitation to appear before 
it, he would not be called before any other select committees. Downing Street declined this 
offer, again citing the convention that Prime Ministers do not give evidence to select 
committees, and arguing that to do so might jeopardise established lines of ministerial 
accountability.
10
  
Yet, behind the scenes, developments were afoot. In December 2001, the then Leader of the 
House of Commons, the late Robin Cook MP, ‘pressed’ the Prime Minister to appear before 
the Liaison Committee as part of a broader parliamentary modernisation programme, and 
Downing Street advisers also attempted to convince Blair of the merits of attending such 
sessions.
11
 But Blair resisted, and in spring 2002, Cook asked the chairman of the Public 
Administration Committee, Tony Wright MP, to drop the matter, because there was ‘simply 
                                                          
7
 Liaison Committee, Evidence from the Prime Minister, 1st Special Report of Session 2001-02, HC 984, 
para.3. 
8
 P Cowley, ‘Parliament’ in A Seldon (ed.) Blair’s Britain 1997-2007, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2007, p. 23. 
9
 Public Administration Select Committee, The Ministerial Code: Improving the Rulebook, 3
rd
 Report of Session 
2000-01, HC 235, Appendix 4. 
10
 Liaison Committee, Shifting the Balance: Unfinished Business, 1
st
 Report of Session 2000-01, HC 321. 
11
 R Cook, The Point of Departure, London: Pocket Books, 2003, p 141. 
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no way that the Prime Minister was ever going to agree to attend’.12 It therefore came as a 
surprise when, in April 2002, the Prime Minister approached the Liaison Committee chair, 
Alan Williams MP, and offered to appear twice a year to discuss domestic and foreign 
affairs.
13
 
Blair later made light of his ‘Damascene conversion’.14 The chairs then in situ reported that 
no reasons were given for the reversal, although several speculated that Blair was probably 
convinced by his advisers that such appearances could usefully demonstrate his engagement 
with Parliament, and that, given Blair’s political skills and communication abilities, he 
probably felt that he had ‘nothing to fear’, with one noting that ‘he was, after all, a trained 
barrister’ 15The start of the new sessions with the Liaison Committee, in July 2002, also 
coincided with Blair’s new schedule of monthly televised press conferences. Both events were 
undoubtedly linked to a desire to make the Prime Minister appear more accountable and 
accessible. As Blair subsequently told the Liaison Committee, ‘politics comes under a great 
deal of attack … and I think a session like this can help us show to the public, and to the 
media, that all of us in Parliament are trying to do our best to struggle with the issues that 
concern our constituents’. 16  Strategically, both the Liaison Committee sessions and the 
monthly press conferences emerged at a point in the Blair premiership when he was 
attempting to regain control of a domestic reform agenda which had stalled during the first 
term, and which was at serious risk of being further marginalised on account of the agenda-
setting consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
17
 Added to this was the 
growing pressures Blair faced in his second term from the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, about 
the likely date of the controversial ‘hand-over’ the two men had agreed in 1994, along with 
the difficulties faced by Number 10 in leveraging Treasury support for public sector reform 
and we begin to understand the value for the Prime Minister of a forum through which he 
could talk extensively about his domestic policy agenda and his vision as head of 
government.
18
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 See A Kelso, M Bennister and P Larkin, ‘The Shifting Landscape of Prime Ministerial Accountability to 
Parliament’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2016, p 5. 
13
 Liaison Committee, Evidence from the Prime Minister, 1st Special Report of Session 2001-02, HC 984.  
14
 Liaison Committee, Oral Evidence: Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Session 2001-02, HC 1095, Q1. 
15
 See A Kelso, M Bennister and P Larkin, ‘The Shifting Landscape of Prime Ministerial Accountability to 
Parliament’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2016, p 7. 
16
 Liaison Committee, Oral Evidence: Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Session 2001-02, HC 1095, Q1 
17
 A Seldon, Blair Unbound, London: Simon and Schuster, 2007, p 47. 
18
 A Seldon, Blair Unbound, London: Simon and Schuster, 2007, p 21. 
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Table 1. Liaison Committee 2002-2016 
 
 
1.4 LIAISON COMMITTEE: EFFECTIVE SCRUTINY MECHANISM? 
In many respects, the Liaison Committee is ideally suited to conduct scrutiny of the Prime 
Minister. It comprises the chairs of the departmental select committees who have since 2010, 
been elected by the whole House of Commons, giving each considerable legitimacy and an 
autonomy from their party management. As the Prime Minister’s remit can involve any or all 
policy areas, being able to draw on the prior knowledge of the chair of any of the relevant 
select committees as the subject under consideration requires can go some way to redressing 
the resource asymmetry between Parliament and the executive highlighted above. It was the 
Committee itself which pushed for the introduction of the evidence sessions in 2001, 
conscious of the parliamentary resource it possessed. Such a considerable repository of 
parliamentary leadership capacity could be deployed in the interests of holding the Prime 
Minister to account. The Committee has also demonstrated a degree of reflexivity and has 
been willing to make changes as a result. For instance, it has worked to narrow the focus of 
each prime ministerial session down to a few topics and limit participation to allow a more 
thorough cross-examination. This greater focus and depth provides a marked contrast to the 
lack of any meaningful reform of PMQs. 
1.5 EXPERIENCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
As far as we are aware, there are no equivalent parliamentary committees that question the 
Prime Minister or relevant Head of Government in other countries. The accountability 
mechanisms for the Prime Ministers in other parliamentary systems are however well worth 
exploring in the context of plenary questions, statements and so on. For instance, 
Scandinavian legislatures tend to scrutinise the Prime Minister at committee ‘account’ 
No. of Prime Ministers Questioned 3 
Tony Blair 11 
Gordon Brown 5 
David Cameron 15 
  
No. of Committee sessions 2002-2016 31 
No. of questions asked at first session - Tony Blair July 2002 123 
No. of questions asked - David Cameron’s last session May 2016 80 
No. of MPs attending the session in July 2002 30 
No. of MPs attending the session in May 2016 14 
Chairs of the Liaison Committee 3 
Alan Williams MP (Labour) 2002-2010 
Alan Beith MP (Liberal Democrat) 2010-2015 
Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative) 2015-2017 
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meetings. These mostly question the Prime Minister on foreign and European policy matters. 
In Denmark, the European Committee (formerly Market Relations Committee) approves the 
Prime Minister’s stance before meetings of the European Council and in turn gets a personal 
report on proceedings afterwards. In the typical situation of minority government in Denmark, 
the Prime Minister may find his or her hands tied by a committee majority reluctant to 
sanction the Prime Minister’s position. In Finland, the Prime Minister frequently accounts to 
the Grand Committee (dealing with EU matters) and the Foreign Affairs Committee.
19
 There 
is no equivalent of the Liaison Committee sessions in similar Westminster system as in 
Australia, Canada or New Zealand, though the Prime Minister may appear at plenary 
questions more often (often deferring to cabinet colleagues). Looking closer to home, in the 
devolved administrations there are now similar mechanisms to question the First Minister in 
a committee setting.
 20
  
SCOTLAND 
In the Scottish Parliament, the First Minister has appeared before the Conveners Group each 
session. The Conveners Group comprises the Conveners of the Scottish Parliament’s 
committees and is analogous to the Liaison Committee, though with some important 
differences. Firstly, it is chaired by the Presiding Officer rather than by a convener selected by 
the rest of the Group and, secondly, although the whole Parliament vote to ratify the 
committee membership, it is decided by party managers rather than election. The Conveners 
themselves are nominally selected by their fellow committee members, but are generally 
uncontested. In terms of the sessions with the First Minister, there are some notable 
difference. Firstly, the First Minister only appears annually. The Conveners Group sessions 
with the First Minister focus exclusively on the Scottish 
Government’s Programme for Government, which sets 
out the legislative agenda and policy priorities for the 
session ahead. This effectively means that, to a large 
degree, it is the Government rather than Parliament 
that sets agenda for the sessions. All available 
Conveners participate though to date; they have been 
confined to asking questions relating to their own 
committees’ remits: we were told that the Presiding 
Officer emphasised that they participate as 
representatives of their committees. Transcripts and 
video recordings of the sessions are added to the 
Conveners Group webpage, but no report is produced.  
                                                          
19
 D. Arter, ‘The Prime Minister in Scandinavia: ‘Superstar’ or Supervisor?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
Vol. 10(2-3), 2004, pp 109-127. 
20
 We have not included the Northern Ireland Assembly Committee on Executive Office here. Although it does 
take evidence from the First Minister as well as the Deputy First Minister, it ranges rather more widely in its 
scrutiny activity and is only partially analogous with the Liaison Committee.  
The Conveners Group 
sessions with the First 
Minister focus exclusively on 
the Scottish Government’s 
Programme for Government, 
which sets out the legislative 
agenda and policy priorities 
for the session ahead. 
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With only three sessions having taken place to date, it is too early to draw firm conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of the sessions. Furthermore, following the 2016 Scottish 
Elections there has been a significant turnover of Conveners and a new Presiding Officer. It 
remains to be seen whether the sessions will even continue or be modified. Reflecting on the 
process, the outgoing Conveners Group recommended that they should continue, but made 
no recommendations beyond that. The Scottish Parliament has encountered at least some 
of the same issues as the Liaison Committee in Westminster. For instance, though the 
Programme for Government gives the sessions with the First Minister a useful focus, it 
involves the Conveners Group trying to cover the entire range of policy in a short session. As 
a result, some consideration has been given to increasing the number of sessions with the 
First Minister and thematising them. Similarly, with all 16 members participating, there is 
little chance for any of them to question the First Minister in any detail. Unsurprisingly, some 
would like the numbers reduced, especially if the sessions are held more frequently. 
WALES 
In the National Assembly for Wales (Senedd), the Committee for the Scrutiny of the First 
Minister meets 2-3 times a year, and our interview research indicates that it emerged as a 
conscious attempt to replicate the Liaison Committee practice. Naturally, as the Senedd 
contains just 60 Assembly Members (AM), the Committee is considerably smaller than the 
Commons' Liaison Committee, with perhaps 4-5 AMs attending the evidence sessions with 
the First Minister. As with the Liaison Committee, the Scrutiny Committee specifies in advance 
the topic or topics on which it wishes to focus, in order for the First Minister and his team 
to prepare, and the session itself involves direct questioning of the First Minister by the 
Committee members. Similarly, the Senedd Committee publishes the transcript of the session, 
and any related correspondence with the First Minister, but does not produce inquiry reports 
of the sort published by other Senedd committees. 
However, there are key differences with the Westminster practice. First, the First Minister is 
frequently accompanied by officials, both from his own office and from the policy 
departments on which the scrutiny focus will fall. Officials answer many of the questions 
asked by the Committee, particularly when they deal with policy detail, and indeed the AMs 
do often direct their questions to the officials rather than the First Minister. In contrast, 
although the Prime Minister is accompanied by officials who sit behind him during the 
Liaison Committee session, and perhaps pass him notes, they do not answer directly to the 
Liaison Committee members. Second, the Senedd Committee has developed the practice of 
holding some of its sessions away from the National Assembly building at Cardiff Bay. For 
example, the session held in October 2015 took place at the National Waterfront Museum 
in Swansea, to correspond with Senedd Swansea Week, and to help facilitate the 
Committee's scrutiny focus on the promotion and marketing of Wales. Third, and leading on 
from this roving capacity, the Committee is far more open to members of the public and 
school pupils attending in the public gallery, and has even experimented with enabling the 
public to ask questions during the scrutiny session. Perhaps as a consequence of all these 
13 | P a g e  
 
points, our analysis of the Committee transcripts and videos of the evidence sessions suggests 
that the Senedd Committee pursues a far less adversarial and confrontational questioning 
style in comparison to that adopted by the MPs on the Liaison Committee. Our research also 
indicates that there has been some difficulty in securing attendance at the sessions from the 
Committee members, and that while this may be attributed to the timing of the sessions 
(frequently on Fridays), it may also hint at broader questions about the purpose and utility 
of the sessions which are not dissimilar to those expressed about the Liaison Committee 
format. 
LONDON 
The Greater London Assembly also performs committee style questioning of the London 
Mayor. In some respects, this is a hybrid of PMQs and the Liaison Committee. It has a partisan 
dimension as the political groups dominate; however, the exchanges take place in a 
committee setting. Question Time occurs 10 times a year, allowing regular and fixed 
examination of the Mayor. Members of the public can submit questions via Assembly 
Members although, in reality, these questions do not make the final cut as party groups 
dominate the agenda. The sessions are not particularly firmly chaired, allowing the Mayor to 
use up precious time and avoid answering the questions. 
Table 2: Comparative Scrutiny Bodies 
Head of 
Executive 
Legislature Scrutiny Body 
Frequency of evidence 
sessions 
Prime 
Minister 
House of 
Commons 
Liaison Committee 2-3 times per year 
First Minister Scottish 
Parliament 
Conveners Committee Once a year 
First Minister Welsh Assembly Committee for the Scrutiny of 
the First Minister 
2-3 times per year 
Mayor Greater London 
Assembly 
Mayor’s Question Time 10 times a year 
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2. THE PROCESS 
Whilst the Liaison Committee is just a select committee of the House of Commons, its 
composition and role make it distinct and the Committee’s hearings with the Prime Minister 
are also unlike regular select committee inquiries.  
The chairs of departmental select committees (as well as those other select committees that 
function in the same way), who comprise the majority of the Liaison Committee, are elected 
through secret ballot by the entire membership of the House of Commons. The remaining 
members are elected within their parliamentary parties. The Liaison Committee is unique in 
having its membership elected by the whole House. The chair of the Liaison Committee is 
selected by the Committee rather than by the whole House. The other feature that 
distinguishes the Liaison Committee from the majority of other select committees that take 
evidence, is that its main functions are administrative, such as approving the budget for 
select committee visits or ensuring that committee inquiries do not overlap.  
The Liaison Committee has, from time to time, undertaken more conventional select 
committee-style inquiries into issues of relevance to select committees such as resources or 
powers, such as on pre-appointment hearings in June 2011.
21
 The Committee expanded its 
sphere of action when it took evidence from the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, on the 
basis of his leadership of the Rio+20 summit in the Prime Minister’s place.22 The Environment 
Audit Committee subsequently asked the Liaison Committee to take evidence on its behalf,
23
 
and it used that session to focus not just on the Rio summit, but also on other policy issues. 
However, the hearings with the Prime Minister are standalone sessions which do not have a 
specific focus or lead to a report in the way the majority of select committees’ hearings do. 
The extent to which this administrative focus and the need to switch to a scrutiny role reduces 
its effectiveness is a theme we return to later in this report. The function and powers of the 
Liaison Committee are set out in the House of Commons Standing Order No. 145 
   
145.—(1) A select committee shall be appointed, to be called the Liaison 
Committee— 
(a) to consider general matters relating to the work of select committees, 
(b) to give such advice relating to the work of select committees as may be 
sought by the House of Commons Commission, and 
                                                          
21
 Liaison Committee, Select Committees and Public Appointments, 1
st
 Report of Session 2010-12, HC 830  
22
 In October 2016 it announced that the Committee would be taking evidence from Sir John Chilcot, as a 
follow up to the publication of the Chilcot report. 
23
 Environmental Audit Select Committee, Outcomes of the Rio+20 Earth Summit, 2
nd
 Report of Session 
2013-14, HC 200, para. 6  
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(c) to report to the House its choice of select committee reports to be debated 
on such days as may be appointed by the Speaker in pursuance of paragraph 
(13) of Standing Order No. 10 (Sittings in Westminster Hall). 
 
 
As evident from above, sessions with the Prime Minister are not listed as a core function. The 
Standing Order adds merely that: 
(2) The committee may also hear evidence from the Prime Minister on matters of 
public policy.
24
 
Notably, the Committee took evidence from the Deputy Prime Minister and Sir John Chilcot 
without a change to this Standing Order. 
2.1 FREQUENCY 
In 2002, the then-Prime Minister, Tony Blair, agreed to appear before the Liaison Committee 
twice a session. Interestingly, in 2000, when the Liaison Committee had first proposed that 
he appear, they requested that he appear just once a session; the Prime Minister refused. 
After Blair’s change of heart, he agreed to appear twice a session for two and half hours. 
The first session involved the entire Liaison Committee membership. In the 2010 Parliament 
this was increased to three appearances a year of 90 minutes apiece. Typically, this has seen 
the Prime Minister appear at the start of the year, between the Easter and the summer 
parliamentary recesses, and again in the autumn.  
Under parliamentary privilege, the Prime Minister cannot be compelled to attend the Liaison 
Committee (or any other select committee). This is reflected in the Standing Orders as above, 
which state that Liaison Committee may (rather than shall) take evidence from the Prime 
Minister. However, there are signs that the sessions are sufficiently well established that it 
would be increasingly hard to avoid a request from the committee to appear. In 2016, after 
initial reluctance to appear before the EU referendum, the Liaison Committee Chair Andrew 
Tyrie was able to exert sufficient political pressure to ensure that a session was held.
25
 
2.2 TOPICS 
Although four topics had been identified in advance of the first session in 2002, almost the 
entire membership of the Liaison Committee participated and it was ultimately left to each 
of them to decide their own questions. With the chairs of each of the policy-focussed 
departmental select committees there, as well as the members of the domestic committees 
(those that deal with the internal running of the Commons such as catering and art); the 
123 questions asked of the Prime Minister represented ‘an unfocussed romp across a wide 
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 The exchange of letters between Andrew Tyrie and the Prime Minister is available on the Liaison Committee 
website. 
16 | P a g e  
 
swathe of public policy’.26 With such a broad sweep of public policy covered in a limited time, 
there was little opportunity to go into any depth. Each question became a ‘single hit’ with 
no real chance to interrogate the Prime Minister’s answers or to excavate the subject more 
deeply. In short, it lacked most of the benefits that a parliamentary committee has at its 
disposal in order to contribute to accountability.  
The Committee was able to reflect on its own experience of questioning the Prime Minister 
and change its practice. At the second hearing, questions focussed more narrowly on the 
selected topics, Iraq and the War on Terror. Subsequent sessions have maintained this focus 
on a handful of main issues or, occasionally, on just one. Figure 1, below, shows the topics 
that have been covered to date. The Committee has throughout tried to focus on areas where 
the Prime Minister has ‘made a difference’, but the Prime Minister’s lack of a clear job 
description or policy competence whereby the incumbent can ‘make of it what he will’—is 
apparent as the sessions have ranged from foreign affairs and defence issues to social policy, 
constitutional affairs and machinery of government issues.  
Figure 1. Subjects covered in Liaison Committee hearings with Prime Minister 2002-2016 
 
 
In some instances, the Committee has responded to the Government’s own agenda, such as 
in its questions on the ‘Big Society’ agenda or on reform of the civil service. But in others, 
the topics have focussed on issues that the Government has been forced to contend with—
military action in the Middle East or the post-2008 recession, for instance—and which the 
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Prime Minister might have preferred to avoid. There have also been sessions focusing on a 
single topic such as the EU Referendum and the Scottish Independence Referendum. 
The areas deemed as those in which Prime Ministers ‘have made a difference’ are not only 
those with a cross-departmental or whole-of-government spread. In many instances, there 
is often nothing uniquely ‘prime ministerial’ about the areas. The contingent nature of the 
role of the Prime Minister presents challenges for the Liaison Committee in its own scrutiny 
endeavours: although Prime Ministers may dominate many, even all, aspects of government, 
they are formally responsible for relatively little. While there have been clear efforts, 
particularly since 2010, to focus the sessions on areas where the Prime Minister is pivotal, or 
has declared a keen interest, the tendency has been to focus on major topics in current affairs, 
topics which could, in most instances, have been covered by the relevant departmental select 
committee. Foreign affairs issues loom conspicuously large: for example, while the Prime 
Minister was being quizzed by the Liaison Committee in 2002 and 2003 about the decision 
to go to war in Iraq, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was pursuing exactly the same 
issue,
27
 yet was unable to interrogate the person ultimately responsible for that decision: 
Tony Blair. The Prime Minister, as Head of Government, is expected to speak for the 
Government on any and all aspects of government policy, and the Prime Minister frequently 
takes a major, even dominant, role in specific policy areas at certain times, as Blair did in 
foreign policy. But, even where this is the case, there is a proper chain of accountability: there 
is a minister to speak for Government on the matter and a select committee with oversight 
responsibility through which MPs can quiz ministers about where decision-making power 
lies and how policy is made. One of the major challenges faced by the Liaison Committee 
has been to determine exactly what topics it can usefully question the Prime Minister about, 
and its success in those determinations has been mixed. 
2.3 PARTICIPATION 
Prior to the 2010 election, the hearings with the Prime Minister typically saw almost all of 
the Liaison Committee members participating. With 25 or more members taking part, they 
could not all be accommodated in one of the main committee rooms. Early in the 2010 
parliament, the decision was taken to reduce the number of MPs participating in the sessions 
(though the membership of the Liaison Committee remained the same). The sessions would 
now be limited to 15 or so members, making them more akin to a conventional select 
committee (though still larger than most). With the reduction in numbers and not all 
members attending, a process to select those participating in each session was required. 
Anecdotally, we were told that this selection was done through a combination of relevance 
to the topics under consideration, ‘buggins’ turn’ and ‘a coalition of the willing’. 
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Data on attendance at the Liaison Committee’s sessions with the Prime Minister in the 2010-
5 Parliament would seem to support this.
28
 Given the prominence given by the committee to 
foreign affairs issues, it is unsurprising to find that Sir Richard Ottaway, chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee was one of the most frequent participants, attending 8 of the 13 Prime 
Ministerial sessions. Issues within the Home Affairs Committee’s remit also featured 
frequently and its chair, Keith Vaz attended 10. Machinery of Government issues were also 
another frequent topic, reflected in the chair of the Public Administration Select Committee 
Sir Bernard Jenkin’s participation in nine of the sessions.  
However, the topic under consideration does not account for the participation and non-
participation of others and it seems that some members were keen to attend, regardless of 
the topic under consideration. For instance, the chair of the Science and Technology 
Committee was one was of the most assiduous attendees, missing only three during the 
parliament, yet topics within his committee’s remit were rarely covered. Similarly, the subject 
matter does not affect the different participation rates of the chairs of the committees 
covering Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: Ian Davidson, the Scottish Affairs chair only 
attended one session whilst his Welsh Affairs Committee counterpart, David T.C. Davies, 
attended eight. Committee workloads may also have played a part: for instance, Andrew 
Tyrie, the chair of the Treasury Committee was also chairing the Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards for some of the Parliament which would have placed further demands 
on his time (though he has been publicly critical of the way the sessions have worked. We 
discuss this further in the next section).  
This idea of participation based on a coalition of the willing (and available) is supported by 
evidence from our interviews. Not all members accorded the Liaison Committee or its sessions 
with the Prime Minister the same importance. Several members we spoke to were critical of 
the Prime Ministerial hearings and, consequently, were not particularly keen to participate. 
We noted the importance of the Chair in setting the tone for the sessions. Drawing together 
chairs who may have long service and expertise in their own committees is a particular 
challenge for the Chair. Managing and leading such a committee requires a different skill set 
from the usual demands. In addition, a Chair needs to balance the requirements of his or 
her own committee with managing the Liaison Committee. The experience from Number 10 
was that the sessions were often characterised by individual exchanges with members and 
less of a collective evidence session. The Chair here has a significant role to play in directing 
and managing the content, tone and coherence of the exchanges. We noticed difference in 
organisation style and activism in chairing of the sessions between incumbents. For instance, 
based on data from the two sessions so far chaired by Andrew Tyrie he takes a much more 
interventionist approach to the questioning as opposed to his predecessor’s more facilitating 
approach. Tyrie as the media noted was keen to assert his authority as chair in the sessions. 
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Figure 2. Liaison Committee Attendance at Prime Ministerial Hearings, 2010 Parliament 
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2.4 COMMITTEE SUPPORT AND PREPARATION 
Unlike other select committees, the Liaison Committee has not had a core secretariat and 
the workload for organising the sessions has largely been absorbed within existing 
committee office resources. Nominally, the Clerk of Committees in the House of Commons 
supports the Liaison Committee. However, in practice, primary organisational responsibility 
has usually fallen to one of the principal clerks in the Commons’ Committee Office. This has 
entailed organising the hearings, including liaising with Number 10 to arrange the Prime 
Minister’s appearance and topics as well as coordinating questions and providing briefing 
material. The briefing material itself is produced by the secretariats from the relevant select 
committees, which the Principal Clerk, alongside a couple of administrative staff, pulls 
together. There has, however, been a recent change in support in the 2015-16 Parliament, 
with two more junior clerks devoting more of their time to the Liaison Committee and to the 
hearings. 
We were told that the topics for the sessions were decided deliberatively within the 
Committee, with suggestions received from members which were then narrowed down 
through discussion. However, dates for the sessions were frequently not established far 
enough in advance for this process to be comprehensive. There was also some ‘finessing’ of 
the eventual topics by the chair. The choice of topics might be influenced by current affairs, 
the Government’s own agenda, issues that several committees had identified as needing 
attention, or sometimes where it had been suggested through the parliamentary grapevine 
that the Prime Minister’s office had taken an interest. The questions themselves were largely 
identified by the Liaison Committee members, in collaboration with the respective select 
committee secretariats. Whilst the work of their own select committees will have clearly 
influenced their choice of topics, there was little evidence that chairs systematically consulted 
their own committee members about possible questions. Indeed, in interview, some actively 
challenged why they should consult their committee members, as they believed they had a 
mandate from the whole House to act on the committee’s behalf. Although questions were 
generated by the Liaison Committee members, there was some attempt at coordination to 
ensure that they covered the key aspects, were in a logical sequence and avoided repetition. 
In drawing up the list of questions, efforts were also made to anticipate the Prime Minister’s 
initial responses to ensure sufficient follow-up. 
2.5 NUMBER 10 
Contact between the clerks and officials in Number 10 seems to have been frequent and a 
cordial working relationship built up between them. The most challenging aspect of this was 
trying to arrange a mutually convenient time for the hearings to take place. The practice has 
been for the Committee to inform the Prime Minister’s Office of the topics that they wish to 
address at each hearing in advance to ensure proper briefing for the Prime Minister. However, 
where the usual practice for select committees is to give prospective witnesses an indication 
of the questions they are likely to face, the Liaison Committee has not done so. We did not 
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hear about any efforts on the part of Number 10 to influence the selection of topics to be 
covered or to veto any. In spite of that, one Liaison Committee member suggested that the 
Liaison Committee secretariat were too ‘cosy’ with Number 10 and too willing to share 
information. 
A small team of civil servants and political 
advisers prepared for the sessions. This has 
been the same team that prepares for PMQs 
and statements to the House. Whilst the 
priority is always preparation for the weekly 
PMQs sessions, the Liaison Committee 
sessions require a different type of 
preparation with more in depth briefing. 
Number 10 will tend to get around two 
weeks’ notice of the topics once the date is set and coordinate briefings from the relevant 
department: the quality of these briefings can often determine how well the Prime Minister 
handles the detailed questioning. The relationship between the Liaison Committee staff and 
Number 10 staff was always cordial. Number 10 was not given the option of vetoing the 
Committee’s topics however; we were informed that, very occasionally, it did ask that a topic 
was avoided until a clear policy had been established. It was often accepted that the Prime 
Minister would want to comment on significant issues in the day’s news; though not 
encouraged, a few relevant questions were fed in, as it would look odd if a major issue was 
ignored. Generally, though Number 10 did not tend to see the sessions as an opportunity to 
get a particular message out to the public, primarily as the media coverage of the sessions 
has been so limited. 
On the other side, there was little evidence of the Prime Minister utilising the sessions to get 
a statement or policy response out. An exception to this occurred in December 2014 when 
the Prime Minister gave a short statement on the terrorist attacks in Australia and Pakistan. 
This statement had been pre-arranged with the chair. Conscious that this section of the 
hearing would be televised and might attract more attention than usual, David Cameron 
kept his jacket on until he had made the statement before removing it for the rest of the 
session.
29
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3. ANALYSIS AND REFLECTION 
The Liaison Committee’s hearings with the Prime Minister are, to the best of our knowledge, 
unique. We are not aware of an equivalent forum where, in a national parliament, the head 
of government appears before a committee to answer questions on areas of policy not of 
their choosing. As a result, there is little in the way of comparative standards by which the 
Liaison Committee’s performance can be judged. Nor are there objective standards against 
which the effectiveness of the scrutiny can be judged. As such, the criticisms of the sessions 
(which are not hard to find) need to be tempered by the fact that the sessions seem to be 
unique. The three Prime Ministers who have appeared to date are widely perceived to have 
dealt with the Committee’s interrogation rather too easily and even to have enjoyed them, 
as a welcome change from PMQs (as Cameron noted in his first session in 2010). The 
Committee itself has shown a willingness to reflect on how the sessions work and make 
changes: the number of sessions has been increased from two to three times a year and the 
number of topics covered and members of the Committee involved in each session has been 
reduced. The current chair, Andrew Tyrie, has, in the past, written about changes he would 
make to the sessions to increase effectiveness, such as monthly sessions with the Prime 
Minister and half an hour of topical questioning.
30
 A significant majority of the current and 
former members of the Committee whom we spoke to were also critical, regarding them as, 
at best, a missed opportunity and, at worst, fundamentally flawed. Some chairs were, 
however, less critical. In their view, the sessions provided a chance for members to engage 
directly with the Prime Minister that they would not otherwise have. Yet, in spite of the 
changes to date, most of our interviewees felt that the sessions have yet to deliver the greater 
prime ministerial accountability promised. 
At least part of this divergence of opinion regarding the usefulness of the sessions stems 
from differing views about the ultimate purpose of the Committee’s hearings with the Prime 
Minister and what the members are trying to achieve. Even after the changes made in the 
last Parliament that narrowed the focus of the sessions to a few topics and reduced the 
number of participants, several members who spoke to us said that the actual purpose of 
the sessions was insufficiently clear or focussed. One former select committee chair felt that 
‘…the sessions could have been much more useful if you’d had a Liaison Committee…that 
was more coherent in what it was trying to do’. A current member of the Committee said of 
the hearings with the Prime Minister that ‘I really don’t understand what its objectives are’. 
The stated purpose of the sessions is nominally to ‘hold the government to account’. But it 
became clear that, in practice, this means different things to different Members. Some 
Members were frustrated that they were not able to get into the detail of policy-making and 
the Prime Minister’s direct and indirect role. A former chair felt that ‘…in terms of really 
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scrutinising what it is that the Prime Minister is doing, it’s not fulfilling its function’. By 
contrast, those who value the sessions could see huge positives in being able to ask the Prime 
Minister a series of questions on a particular issue in a way that PMQs, for example, simply 
did not allow. The public, too, seem to appreciate the calmer, more discursive approach of 
the Liaison Committee compared to the political theatre of PMQs.
31
 
3.1 QUESTIONING 
The different ways in which committee members interpreted the accountability role was 
apparent in the types of questions that were asked in the sessions and the way in which they 
were asked. The current and former members of the Liaison Committee that we spoke to 
shared the view that questions in select committee hearings should be, amongst other things, 
short and to the point. A former Liaison Committee member said that ‘…the longer the 
question is, the easier it is for the person answering to go down various blind alleys’. Some 
Chairs, in interview expressed frustration that the sessions with the Prime Minister did not 
reflect this style of questioning. Too often members ask long detailed questions, sometimes 
essentially making statements with which the Prime Minister would be invited to comment 
on or agree with. Often, we were told, the impression given was that these questions were 
not primarily designed to elicit information but rather Committee members were using the 
opportunity of a face-to-face meeting with the Prime Minister to put across their own views 
to him: ‘…they tended to be an exercise in every select committee chair demonstrating their 
in-depth knowledge about the subject…it was more like a pop quiz than it was really like a 
scrutiny session’. This tendency towards statements and grandstanding led to a further 
frustration as members felt their time for questioning the Prime Minister was squeezed as a 
result. 
It is straightforward enough to identify the long-winded statement, but less evident why 
members take this approach. The reasons put forward by interviewees and others present 
three possibilities.  
a. It was suggested that the higher profile that sessions with the Prime Minister have 
seen Members behave differently. One former member suggested that Liaison 
Committee Members are too concerned about making a mistake in such a public 
forum—Parliamentary sketch writers are usually in attendance and no chair wants to 
be the focus of one of their columns—and, as a consequence, tend to over-prepare 
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and over-elaborate their questions. Another former Committee member thought such 
overly-detailed questions were a ‘waste of time’, at least without giving advanced 
notice to the Prime Minister, who is unlikely to be responsible for the technical 
minutiae of policy as opposed to the broader, strategic approach. He said the 
questions should focus instead on ‘relationships, politics and the philosophy that the 
Prime Minister brings to bear rather…[than] catching someone out’. In this respect, 
though the questions are long and detailed, the contrast between the Liaison 
Committee sessions with the Prime Minister and PMQs might not be as great as had 
been assumed. 
 
b. An alternative explanation was that Liaison Committee Members were used to 
chairing their own select committee and less used to working as rank-and-file 
committee members. Accustomed to being first amongst equals in their own 
committees, it was suggested that some might find it hard to relinquish this more 
dominant role when in the Liaison Committee. A former Liaison Committee member 
said that too many of her colleagues ignored the lessons about the brevity of 
questions once they were faced with the Prime Minister: ‘as soon as you get very 
senior then people start to get more expansive because obviously everyone is there to 
hear them’. Another thought too many focussed on the watching media rather than 
what the sessions were supposed to be focussing on: ‘If it was not about trying to 
find the killer question that gets run to News at Six and actually much more about 
allowing the Prime Minister to explain his course of action and to make the Prime 
Minister relax when he's answering questions, I think Parliament would get more out 
of it’. 
c. We were given a different perspective from a non-Government member of the Liaison 
Committee who joined after the 2015 election. This member thought that the 
opportunity to question the Prime Minister persistently, limiting his ability to evade 
questions with interruptions and follow-up questions, was invaluable. Crucially, this 
positive view seems to stem, at least in part, from a different interpretation of the 
purpose of the hearings with the Prime Minister. From this perspective, the sessions 
were less about uncovering the Prime Minister’s thinking or his role and rather more 
about landing blows on behalf of one’s party or agenda: ‘I had a set number of points 
that I wanted to get in there…I had my sort of agenda’. This member went on to say 
‘If you’re given the chance to give the Prime Minister a bloody nose then damned 
right you’ll take it’. Whilst some regard select committees as a forum where scrutiny 
takes a less adversarial form, it would seem that this member, a select committee 
‘If you’re given the chance to give the Prime Minister a bloody nose 
then damned right you’ll take it’. 
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chair who manages his own committee consensually, did not adopt that approach in 
the sessions with the Prime Minister. The other members we spoke to would not have 
advocated such aggressive statement of purpose. However, whilst complaining about 
grandstanding, some did say that the interrogation that Prime Ministers have been 
subject to in the Liaison Committee has been insufficiently robust and that, at times, 
has been rather too respectful. 
3.2 THE LIAISON COMMITTEE PROCESS 
A number of those we spoke to who were most critical of the Liaison Committee sessions 
with the Prime Minister thought that the process surrounding the hearings and even the 
Liaison Committee itself were not suitable for the task of holding the Prime Minister to 
account. Some felt that it was too big to perform the task effectively. Even with only 15 or 
so Members participating in each session with the Prime Minister, the sessions are still larger 
than most select committees. Moreover, many already consider select committees to be too 
large. A former chair told us that ‘our most effective select committee hearings were the 
ones when we had only four or five people there’.32  
The sessions with the Prime Minister 
are a high profile, but relatively 
infrequent aspect of the Liaison 
Committee’s work. Most of its tasks are 
bureaucratic or procedural: selecting 
committee reports for debate in 
Westminster Hall or allocating the 
select committee travel budget, for 
example. Several current and former 
Members felt that this constrained its effectiveness as a scrutiny body. With its focus on 
allocating resources (money, time), it lacked the focus that the policy-focussed select 
committees. Some Members criticised it for being overly hierarchical, with more high profile 
or established Members able to dominate. The composition of the Liaison Committee might 
also contribute to this. It is the only select committee on which almost all the Members have 
been appointed through whole of House elections. With the Members mostly able to claim 
a House-wide mandate, rather than just the chair, it was suggested to us that the Liaison 
Committee lacks the coherence and shared purpose of the policy-focussed committees. The 
standing of the membership presents another challenge as chairs regard themselves as the 
elite members of the House, seniority conferred by mandate and position. 
Unlike most select committee oral evidence sessions, the Liaison Committee’s hearings with 
the Prime Minister are largely freestanding and are not part of a wider inquiry. Whilst a few 
topics are announced in advance, there are no terms of reference and no report is published 
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at the end. In short, the process falls a long way from having the focus of a regular select 
committee inquiry. As a consequence, some of those we spoke to felt that questions often 
did not really form part of a coherent whole. Efforts were made by the chair to keep 
questioning on track, but we were told that, frequently, Members were not easily corralled.  
It should be stressed that these view were not held by all our interviewees, but by critics of 
the existing arrangements. Furthermore, whilst there were shared views about some of the 
shortcomings, there was little evidence of consensus about how it might be improved, a 
subject we address in the next section. Much depended on the Chair, who of course had his 
own select committee to lead. 
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4. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Based on the reflections from current and former participants contained in the previous 
section, certain areas of potential reform present themselves. The range of possible reforms 
are distributed along a continuum. At one end, there are those designed to make the current 
Liaison Committee sessions with the Prime Minister more effective. These might involve 
changes in behaviour of the participants or modest, incremental changes to the existing 
process and could be achieved with relative ease. At the other end of the continuum are 
those that propose replacing the Liaison Committee sessions with a different means for 
enhancing prime ministerial accountability. Naturally, these would be harder to achieve, not 
least because they would require the Prime Minister’s willingness to cooperate with the new 
process. 
4.1 INCREASED FREQUENCY 
The number of hearings with the Prime Minister has already increased from biannually when 
first introduced to triennially in 2010-15. Andrew Tyrie, the current chair of the Liaison 
Committee, has argued that the sessions should be increased to monthly occasions, whilst 
Parliament is sitting.
33
 As a concession to the Prime Minister’s diary, he suggests that PMQs 
should not be held in those weeks that he appears before the committee. He regards it as a 
necessary response to the increasing ‘presidentialisation’ of power in British politics.34 
Given the somewhat equivocal views many of our respondents held about the current 
usefulness of the prime ministerial hearings with the Committee, we did not find a great deal 
of support for such a measure: Andrew Tyrie himself acknowledged that many do not share 
his position on this. It would seem that, for such a move, the sessions would have to be 
perceived to be more effective than is currently the case. Tyrie also acknowledged the risk 
that, by further increasing the focus on the Prime Minister and his role in government, such 
a move might actually reinforce the presidentialisation that he seeks to address. Furthermore, 
whilst the Prime Minister might be unique in not having a departmental select committee to 
appear before, no Secretary of State appears before their select committee as often as 
monthly. Regardless, it seems that the Prime Minister’s office would strongly resist such a 
move, which would almost certainly see other parliamentary engagement sacrificed if it were 
introduced. That said, the Prime Minister has struggled to appear three times a year as agreed. 
We note that in the 2015-16 parliamentary session, David Cameron only appeared in January 
and May 2016. He appeared only once (in February 2015) between December 2014 and 
January 2016. The Prime Minister did, somewhat reluctantly, appear before the Liaison 
Committee in May 2016 to answer questions on the EU Referendum having attempted to 
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resist. The Committee under Andrew Tyrie managed to put sufficient pressure on the Prime 
Minister to attend following a public exchange of letters and verbal exchange at the January 
2016 session.
35
 
4.2 GREATER PURPOSE 
The sessions often suffer from a lack of purpose, which means the committee is much less 
effective, in terms of interrogation, than other select committee hearings. We have already 
noted the difference between the Liaison Committee’s sessions with the Prime Minister and 
the majority of select committee inquiries. Whilst they do hold one-off, freestanding evidence 
sessions, the majority of oral evidence taken by select committees forms part of a broader 
inquiry which gives focus: terms of reference are drawn up, witnesses are selected and cross-
examined with these in mind, and conclusions and recommendations are made as a result. 
This takes place in the context of committees that already have clear policy jurisdictions, a 
clear role (set out in the Standing Orders) and are given a further steer by the list of core 
tasks drawn up by the Liaison Committee itself. By contrast, the Liaison Committee has none 
of these, beyond the somewhat vague clause in the Standing Orders suggesting that it ‘may’ 
take evidence from the Prime Minister. This concern about a lack of focus was evident in the 
views of one current Member of the Liaison Committee who said ‘I don’t understand what 
[the Liaison Committee] is pursuing with the Prime Minister’. 
The participants we spoke to were not convinced that the hearings should form part of a 
larger select committee or that producing a report would be the best way to sharpen up this 
focus. Nonetheless, a stronger emphasis on the potential outcomes of the sessions would be 
welcome. Research by Hannah White of the Institute for Government recommended that, 
‘amongst other things, select committees should reflect on: what the ultimate purpose of 
an inquiry should be; what committees are actually trying to achieve, and a strategy to put 
that into effect’36. Amongst other things, the Liaison Committee has been a promoter of best 
practice for select committees in general, for example, with its list of core tasks. Yet it does 
not seem to have privileged this sort of strategising for itself. Greater reflection on, and clarity 
about, what it is trying to achieve in each of the hearings with the Prime Minister and a plan 
for putting this into operation would help to alleviate this problem. 
4.3 MORE EFFECTIVE QUESTIONING 
Furthermore, based on our interviews, the simplest way to improve the effectiveness of the 
hearings with the Prime Minister would be to change the way that questions are asked. If 
there is a consensus that short, incisive questions are the most appropriate, then it is clearly 
within the power of committee members to put that into practice consistently. Yet it would 
seem to be less straightforward to achieve. If it is true that the types of questions, and the 
way in which they are asked, are leaving the potential effectiveness of the hearings unfulfilled, 
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it is not simply because the members are unaware of how to ask questions. The Liaison 
Committee largely comprises experienced select committee members, veterans of numerous 
evidence sessions in which they have interrogated a plethora of witnesses. Some may have 
even participated in the training in the art of asking questions that is now available to select 
committees at the beginning of each Parliament, incidentally as recommended by the Liaison 
Committee itself.
37
 Insofar as it is true that the style of questioning is reducing the 
effectiveness of the hearings (see 3.1 above), it is evident that the high profile of the prime 
ministerial sessions with the Liaison Committee and the nature of the committee itself 
contributes to it. Stronger group regulation, by the chair, may improve this. However, there 
are strong countervailing pressures and, with individual committee members having a 
personal mandate through the whole-of-House ballot system, some may be resistant to 
attempts to regulate their short opportunity to challenge the prime minister.  
4.4 INCREASED FOCUS BY MEMBERS 
The issue of lack of focus was linked to committee size by a number of our interviewees. The 
potential lack of effectiveness of an excessively large committee has been widely recognised.
38
 
With 25 or 30 Members, there was little time for proper cross-examination and it was hard 
to maintain focus. Furthermore, large committees often lack the 
cohesiveness and commitment amongst Members of smaller ones: we 
have already noted one former chair who thought that committees 
functioned best when only four or five Members had been present. 
Changes have already been made, with only 15 or so Members now 
participating in each session with the Prime Minister. However, as we 
noted in the previous chapter, 15 Members is still larger than the 
departmental select committees, most of which are limited to eleven 
by their Standing Orders. When the Wright Committee considered the 
matter, some committee members favoured a maximum select 
committee of only nine members.  
For the Liaison Committee, there is a tension. On the one hand, there 
is the desire to include sufficient numbers to cover the range of policy 
areas and allow equal opportunity for all members to interrogate the 
Prime Minister at some point. On the other hand, there is the desire to 
limit participation to keep the sessions tight and focussed, and to allow sufficient opportunity 
to cross-examine thoroughly. With participation at least partly reflecting the topics being 
addressed with the Prime Minister, the issue also reflects the tension between focussing on 
policy areas that are topical, those in which only the Prime Minister can effectively answer 
questions, and covering as wide a range of policy as possible. The sessions have been 
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dominated by certain issues (perhaps reflecting the Prime Minister’s priorities and the power 
dynamic in the Committee) and hence questioning has been dominated by certain key 
committee members. As we saw in section two, the Committee’s focus on foreign affairs 
and home affairs issues saw the chairs of those committee attend almost all of the sessions 
in the last Parliament, with others attending very few.  
A potential resolution might involve both identifying the topics to be addressed with the 
Prime Minister in a particular session as well as selecting the Liaison Committee members to 
participate rather further in advance and with a more deliberate effort to cover the range of 
relevant policy. This subgroup could then work together to prepare for the session in the 
way a regular select committee might. Identifying the policy areas well advance does risk 
overlooking some more topical issues. However, one of the changes Andrew Tyrie has 
proposed in the past has been to allow time at the end of the hearings to question the Prime 
Minister on topical issues to follow the regular cross-examination.
39
 This would offer a 
compromise between topicality and in-depth scrutiny. Questions could be garnered from 
outside the Committee on matters identified via public consultation (in for example the 
Petitions Committee).
40
 
The Liaison Committee is unlike other, predominantly policy-focussed, select committees. 
The question of its suitability for holding the Prime Minister to account was raised by several 
sceptical participants. For some former and current members, the Liaison Committee is 
simply ill-suited to scrutinising the Prime Minister by its nature. Scrutinising the Prime 
Minister has comprised only a relatively small part of its workload. In the last Parliament, its 
monthly meetings generally had a greater focus on tasks such as approving applications from 
select committees to travel as part of their inquiries. The success with which it had managed 
to move from this administrative role to a scrutiny role was questioned. More recently, much 
of the responsibility for this role has been delegated to its staff. Other more routine decision-
making is now devolved to a sub-group of members known as ‘The Quartet’. As a result, 
one current member told us that it was a ‘disparate group’, lacking the sense of common 
purpose of other select committees: ‘The only two things they have in common: they’re 
Members of Parliament; they chair select committees. There’s no focus’. Delegating some of 
its administrative roles might, in time, allow it to focus more narrowly on its scrutiny function. 
However, thus far at least it has not done so (though it is early: at the time of writing, the 
new committee has only met with the Prime Minister twice since the 2015 election and is 
yet to question the new Prime Minister). Furthermore, if, by delegating these functions, the 
committee meets less often, it risks slipping even further down the list of priorities for its 
members who are already busy with the select committees that they were elected by their 
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31 | P a g e  
 
peers to chair and further weakening the cohesiveness that seems to contribute to select 
committee effectiveness. 
4.5 ALTERNATIVES TO LIAISON COMMITTEE SCRUTINY  
In spite of its apparent shortcomings, there is a sound rationale for the Prime Minister to 
appear before the Liaison Committee. The committee does, after all, cover the full range of 
policy areas within its membership. The directly elected membership gives it a degree of 
legitimacy and seniority. Nonetheless, there were former and current members who regard 
its shortcomings to be significant enough that the reforms already put in place will make 
little difference. They told us that the task of scrutinising the Prime Minister should fall to an 
entirely different parliamentary body. However, whilst there was a consensus regarding the 
shortcomings of the Liaison Committee amongst those we spoke to, we found less 
agreement about what should replace it as the main vehicle for scrutinising the Prime 
Minister and none of the options we heard was without their own shortcomings. 
One option, suggested by a former member, is just to revoke the convention the Prime 
Minister does not appear before select committees. There might be a temptation on the part 
of the newly empowered committees to summon the Prime Minister as part of every inquiry 
they undertake. However, an undertaking from the Prime Minister to appear before each 
select committee once a Parliament would overcome this. Issues present themselves though. 
A mechanism by which the committees are prioritised would need to be established. 
Furthermore, this approach pays no heed to topicality. For instance, in the event of military 
action towards the end of a parliament, after the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
have already had their one chance to interrogate the Prime Minister would see the Prime 
Minister go unscrutinised. In March 2016, the Foreign Affairs Committee had a request for 
the Prime Minister to give evidence on Libya turned down by his office. 
An alternative could be to replace the Liaison Committee hearings with joint sittings of the 
existing select committees examining broad policy areas in turn. In this model, the Prime 
Minister might be cross-examined on economic matters once a year in a joint sitting of the 
Treasury, Business Innovation and Skills, and Work and Pensions Committees, for instance, 
or on international matters by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Development 
Committees. This would, of course, better integrate the hearings with the work of the select 
committees, although it could be argued that this would be at the expense of topicality. 
However, would joint sittings encourage the sort of cohesion that was identified as being 
important? Would the different interests and agendas of the participating committees 
undermine the focus of the hearings? Given what we have heard about the need to keep 
numbers below fifteen, could this be squared with the desire of members of the three 
committees to participate? 
Another option—perhaps the simplest—might be to use a single committee to scrutinise the 
Prime Minister. It could be an existing committee: if Number 10 and the Prime Minister were 
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included alongside the Cabinet Office, the role could fall within the Public Administration 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee’s remit. Or a specific select committee could be 
established to scrutinise the Prime Minister and Number 10. However, would the other select 
committee’s chairs willingly relinquish the privilege and publicity associated with 
interrogating the Prime Minister? 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The Liaison Committee sessions with the Prime Minister represent an important scrutiny 
function and are now an established conduit between the executive and the legislature. The 
sessions are unusual as a standalone evidence exercise and it is hard to find equivalent 
sessions in other jurisdictions. The sessions provide a complementary forum for senior MPs 
to engage with the Prime Minister beyond the partisan arena of PMQs. This analytical and 
deliberative setting is much more conducive to informative and illuminating exchanges. 
Reforms that have narrowed the number of participants and focused the content of sessions 
are to be welcomed. The sessions do however have the potential to enhance the relationship 
between the Prime Minister and the legislature. 
The sessions are now more structured and better organised. With committee members 
empowered by election, they have a stronger mandate to challenge the Prime Minister. The 
chair of the committee plays a key role in shaping the tone and format of the sessions, both 
in planning and practice. This has seen the Prime Minister noticeably placed under greater 
scrutiny in the more recent session. We expect this to continue. 
Our analysis identified four areas to strengthen: greater frequency, purpose, effectiveness of 
questioning and improved focus. On frequency, although unlikely to agree to a greater 
number of appearances, it would be beneficial if the Prime Minister appeared more often, 
tilting the balance (albeit only slightly) away from PMQs. On purpose, we found that the 
sessions did lack a guiding aim or purpose. The terms of reference for the sessions with the 
Prime Minister could be much more specific. It is unclear if the Prime Minister is questioned 
as the Head of Government or as the leading politician. This was most evident in the last 
session on the EU referendum. On questioning, we found that the length, tone and focus of 
questioning varied greatly between members. It rests with the chair to tighten up 
questioning style, but the sessions are more valuable as an arena to press the Prime Minister 
on detail than make personal points. We also found multiple drivers explaining style and 
content of questions and these are enhanced when engaging with the Prime Minister. In 
general, sharpening up of questioning would help to raise the profile of the sessions. On 
focus the challenge of corralling an elite group of senior MPs, each with an individual 
mandate, is substantial and falls to the chair to manage. Concentrating on only two topics 
per session has helped. Shifting from individual exchanges between members and the Prime 
Minister to a collective probing of strategy, process and vision is worth pursuing if these 
sessions are to become a focal point for parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. 
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
We would recommend that it is worth persevering with the Liaison Committee sessions with 
the Prime Minister. Whilst acknowledging the validity of many of the criticisms of the Liaison 
Committee as a scrutiny vehicle, we believe there is much merit in continuing with the 
exercise. The fact that the prime ministerial sessions exist means that there is something to 
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build on and there is scope to improve the effectiveness of its scrutiny function. With the 
usual norms of politics being challenged at present, a stronger relationship between the 
Prime Minister and parliament is to be encouraged. The Liaison Committee sessions can help 
facilitate this. 
If one accepts that the sessions themselves have merit in placing the Prime Minister before a 
parliamentary select committee containing senior parliamentarians, we recommend some 
potential areas to make the sessions more effective. 
1. Frequency. There are obvious benefits to greater frequency of sessions with the Prime 
Minister. More sessions would raise their profile with the public and the media. 
Number 10 would need to devote more attention to these sessions in the preparation 
and briefing cycle. There would also be greater continuity and flexibility if the number 
of sessions were increased to at least four per year. The Prime Minister could appear 
at the start of each session to set out the programme for government (a similar 
approach to the Convener’s Committee in Scotland) and be challenged on aspects. A 
new Prime Minister taking over mid-term should also appear as soon as possible, this 
would present an ideal opportunity for MPs to quiz a new Prime Minister, in particular 
on Brexit negotiations.  
2. Purpose. The Committee should consider how the sessions could be linked together 
with a clear purpose of inquiry. This could be via an annual report, clearer terms of 
engagement and a greater exchange of correspondence. Members should also 
consider how material from the sessions could be utilised on the floor of the House 
or elsewhere in committee. Whilst the slimmed down version of Member participation 
is to be welcomed the committee should consider options for public engagement and 
greater media engagement. Questions of public concern could be asked in a short 
section at the end of each session (these could be filtered through the Petitions 
Committee) to provide topicality. Consideration could be given to making the sessions 
more public – held in a larger committee room or even beyond the Westminster estate. 
This would fit into the public engagement agenda identified as important to 
reinvigorating parliamentary democracy and public participation. 
3. Effective questioning. Members of the Committee should be encouraged to ask 
shorter, more succinct questions to the Prime Minister. Though these are senior select 
committee chairs, it could be part of self-reflection that encourages sharper 
questioning along with some gentle guidance from the chair. 
4. Focus. The Committee should shape the substance of the sessions on decision-making 
at the heart of government. If the sessions are going to shed light on areas of Prime 
Ministerial responsibility, a stronger focus on how decisions were formulated would 
be illuminating. 
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Whilst public perceptions of prime ministerial accountability centre on Prime 
Minister’s Questions (PMQ), Liaison Committee sessions have now operated 
since 2002, questioning successive Prime Ministers. The Committee has 
undergone a process of significant institutional learning because of its early 
experiences, and has narrowed the number of topics and the number of 
questioners, increased to three sessions a year, sharpening the scrutiny 
blade. 
Primarily, the sessions enable the Prime Minister to be challenged on the 
government’s record in a less partisan manner than weekly PMQs. The 
sessions are generally informative exchanges on broad government strategy 
and contemporary issues, which provide for far more detailed prime 
ministerial justification of policy decision making. When canvassed the 
public found these sessions positive, but knew little about them. These 
sessions with the Prime Minister therefore constitute important connective 
tissue between the executive and the legislature, but have thus far attracted 
little attention. However we recommend that the sessions could be more 
frequent, have an increased sense of purpose, be more effective in the 
questioning of the Prime Minister and demonstrate a greater focus. 
This report summarises the findings of research funded by the Nuffield 
Foundation and shows how it expands on our understanding of both the 
limits and the possibilities of democratic accountability mechanisms.  
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